Language, Religion, and Identity in Indonesia by Errington, J.
Regional issues1 6 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  3 / 9 9
Southe ast  As i a
J OS E P H  E R R I N G T O N
Social, political, and economic turmoil now make it
easy to forget that just two years ago Indonesia
stood out amongst ethno-linguistically plural na-
tions for its successful nationalist and developmen-
talist dynamic. And as recently as the mid-1990s, I n-
donesian modernization seemed to be unimpeded
by religious tension. 
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in IndonesiaPresident Suharto and his New Order gov-ernment received international praise foreconomic progress among a diverse, p e a c e-
fully coexisting citizenry of Muslims, Bud-
dhists, Protestants, Catholics, and Hindus.
But over the last two years bloody civil un-
rest, mostly along ethno-religious lines, has
arisen out of conditions of economic r e c e s-
sion and political uncertainty. Some see par-
allels between this unravelling of Indone-
siaÕs social fabric, and the strife in the Balka-
ns following the end of the Cold War. With
the demise of SuhartoÕs authoritarian state,
by this line of reasoning, Ôage-oldÕ, Ôprimor-
dialÕ ethno-religious hatreds have been al-
l o w e d to emerge. But current events can
also be plausibly read as effects and even
continuations of the less praiseworthy as-
p e c t s of New Order rule.
Fear and violence which now feed each
other in many parts of Indonesia have clear
antecedents in the massacres of hundreds
o f thousands which occurred in the dark
days of 1965, and which underwrote the le-
gitimacy and style of New Order rule. Some
o f the most vicious clashes are now occur-
ring in areas where state transmigration and
development programmes have created
c o m m u n a l conflict across lines of ethno-re-
ligious difference; some ethnic r e s e n t m e n t s
which have fuelled riot, murder, and rape,
date from the colonial era, and were in turn
exploited rather than effaced under New
Order rule. 
If there is more than one diagnosis of the
current trouble, there is likewise more than
one way to think about possible Indone-
s i a n futures. Here I consider the future of
ethno-religious pluralism in Indonesia with
an eye to the unobvious but constitutive
r o l e of languages in the Indonesian national
project. This may seem a distanced way of
addressing the kinds of atrocities which c o n-
tinue to be committed with impunity.
Nonetheless, language is integral to the
nexus of religious and national identity,
w h i c h will continue to be crucial for any
brighter, less bloody Indonesian future. Re-
lying heavily but not exclusively on my
o w n experiences in Central Java, I sketch
the linguistic grounds of ethnicity, national-
ism and religion in Indonesia with special a t-
tention to the ambiguities of identity which
l i n g u i s t i c pluralism has allowed.
From its inception in 1965, the New Order
government operated and legitimized itself
through a far-reaching, top-down pro-
gramme of national development (in In-
donesian, p e m b a n g u n a n n a s i o n a l) . C r u c i a l
here are just two dimensions of this vast en-
terprise: the establishment of Indonesian
(b a h a s aI n d o n e s i a) as the national l a n g u a g e ,
and of monotheism as the common at-
tribute of state-sanctioned religious identi-
ties. 
Indonesian language in the
Indonesian nation-state
Before independence, the language now
called Indonesian counted as an artificial
language for administration in the Dutch
E a s t Indies, a non-native variety of Malay
which was spoken natively in several other
dialects by a few million subjects in
t h e colonies. But since 1965, knowledge and
use of Indonesian across Indonesian territo-
ry has exploded. At a 1990 conference,
t h e Indonesian Minister of Education and
Culture asserted, not implausibly, that 83
percent of citizens over the age of five k n e w
Indonesian, and that by 2010, all Indone-
sians would speak the national language. So
Indonesian is a national language s p o k e n
natively by relatively few Indonesians. Most
know it as a second language lacking pri-
mordial links to a distinct group of n a t i v e
speakers. This paucity of native speakers
m a k e s Indonesian less a non-native lan-
guage Ð that is, a language native to some
ÔotherÕ group in the country Ð than an un-
native language, that is, devoid of ante-his-
torical roots in some ethnic, religious, or ter-
ritorial identity. 
The New Order also zealously promoted
Indonesian-ness through the five principles
(the Panca Sila) which count together as
a summary ideology of official Indonesian
nationalism. Most relevant here is the first
principle, which establishes monotheism as
both a condition of citizenship and a para-
meter for religious tolerance. In effect, it rec-
onciles national unity with religious plural-
ism through an obligation that citizens a c-
knowledge one of five authorized, (puta-
tively) monotheistic religions: Islam, Protes-
tant and Catholic Christianity, Hinduism(!),
and Buddhism. In fact, the vast majority
o f Indonesians Ð 90 percent of the popula-
tion, or more than 180 million Ð count as
Muslims at least for official statistical p u r-
poses. Current ethno-religious strife is
throwing into relief the longstanding dis-
crepancy between MuslimsÕ demographic
d o m i n a n c e in the populace on one hand,
and IslamÕs official coequality with four reli-
gions of far fewer adherents on the other. As
a result, there have been ambiguous, some-
times conflicted understandings of the
rights and obligations of Indonesians as
members of an Islamic community (u m a t)
and citizens of a secular nation-state (n e-
g a r a). Here I am concerned with the instru-
mental and symbolic roles which languages
have played in these vexed political and cul-
t u r a l arenas. Indonesian, I suggest, has
helped foster official religious tolerance by
assimilating religious doxa and practice, v i a
religious language, to the institutions of the
State. This is a double development that I
sketch here with an eye to Islam, but also to
the peculiarly Indonesian version of Hin-
duism which has highly Sanskritized Old Ja-
vanese as its vehicle. 
Language and religious
c o m m u n i t y
In his influential account of the rise of na-
tionalism, I m a g i n e d C o m m u n i t i e s, Benedict
Anderson suggests that secular/national l a n-
guages (like Indonesian) contrast in impor-
tant ways with sacred/esoteric languages of
religious discourse (like Classical Arabic or
Old Javanese). He links the rise of national-
ism to the spread of secular literacy in na-
tional languages. These differ crucially from
what he calls ÔTruth languagesÕ, which are
v e h i c l e s of sacred texts and discourse, im-
bued with religious truth, and t r a n s m i t t e d
through restricted literacy. The ascendance
o f standard national languages, Anderson
argues, makes all languages c o m p a r a b l e
and intertranslatable, including those which
a r e privileged as vehicles of sacred dis-
course and transcendent t r u t h s . I n d o n e s i a n ,
as one such national language, can be con-
sidered in this regard with an eye to Islamic
reform movements, which have become in-
creasingly salient in current Indonesian pol-
i t i c s . Under the New Order, groups like
Muhammadiyah were restricted in their ac-
tivism to efforts to purify Islam of local syn-
c r e t i s m s and heterodoxies, and did so
through educational systems which p r o v i d e
direct, knowledgeable access to the Koran.
T h i s scripturalist movement has made
IslamÕs Truth language focal, but taught it in
a modern educational framework through
Indonesian. The national language, as the
medium of instruction, thus takes on a si-
multaneously privileged and symbiotic role
i n relation to Arabic and the Islamic project.
If IndonesianÕs un-native, non-ethnic origins
enhances its status over and against a m u l t i-
plicity of local, ethnic languages, it also
gains value as a ÔneutralÕ linguistic mediator
of religiously based knowledge.
A similar but more striking instance of this
c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y between national and reli-
gious identities involves marginal h i g h l a n d
Javanese communities, where peasants re-
sponded to government requirements that
they acknowledge an authorized religion by
collectively espousing Hinduism. Though
a s s o c i a t e d primarily with Bali, Hinduism on
that island is universally recognized to have
its antecedents in pre-colonial Java. The
State actively supported these rural Hindu
communities by making Hindu texts and
doxa required subjects of study in local
s c h o o l s . Because they are taught in Indone-
sian, the national language becomes the
means of access to standardized, public ver-
sions of formerly esoteric, sacred Old Ja-
vanese texts. The paradoxical result is that
the national language mediates between
t h e s e villagers and the ancestors they imag-
ine to have been the original practitioners
of Hinduism in Java, and original users
o f the sacred Old Javanese Truth language.
Their assertion of a distinctly local religious
identity is thus bracketed or muted by t h e
intervention of an un-native, national medi-
um of religious i n s t r u c t i o n . The broad point,
then, is that the Indonesian language
helped to mute political and cultural ten-
sions under the New Order that arose from
the condition of religious pluralism and re-
q u i r e m e n t s of national unity. When Indone-
sianÕs role as mediator between religious af-
filiation and national identity is foreground-
ed, it becomes easier to gauge that lan-
guageÕs enduring salience for the national
project. Indonesian survives as an infra-
structural means to reduce or elide felt dif-
f e r e n c e s between religious and nationalist
modes of community.
Speculation on multiple political and cul-
tural saliences of language might lack clear
relevance to ongoing, deadly conflict; but i t
might help to envision a polity in which a
national language facilitates not just reli-
gious diversity but a civil society, and t h e
sort of public sphere which the New Order
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y suppressed. As other New
Order successes come to seem hollow and
illusory, IndonesianÕs enduring viability may
o b t r u d e if it subserves an Indonesian ver-
sion of public citizenship, and a public dis-
course in which the demands of faith and
country are neither completely divorced,
nor entirely congruent. Perhaps I n d o n e s i a n
will be among the New OrderÕs best and
most lasting legacies: a medium for public
discourse within and across lines of political
and religious difference, a national mode
o f discourse never supported by an authori-
tarian state which successfully fostered a ve-
hicle for it. '
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